Author's reply -Introduction Commentaries on the cognitive-developmental approach to ethical or moral education most often focus on one or both of two concerns: a) the philosophical basis of the claim to moral adequacy of the higher reasoning stages, and b) the empirical support for cognitive-developmental theory in general, and as it applies to the development of moral reasoning in particular. Not unpredictably, Raanon Gillon's reactions to Teaching medical ethics: The cognitive-developmental view' included both. While these general concerns have been addressed in other contexts2-7, a brief specific response to Gillon's comments is appropriate for the readers of this Journal.
Gillon's philosophical concerns appear to be that the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education is philosophically irrelevant and that there is no basis for claiming the greater logical and philosophical adequacy of higher stages. These are not uncommon nor unimportant misconceptions of the cognitive-developmental approach. While space limitations prohibit comprehensive responses to these issues, I shall briefly address them, urging the interested reader to consult the sources cited earlier, or to correspond directly with me.
A psychological approach The cognitive-developmental approach to moral development and moral education is primarily a psychological one in that it deals with the cognitive skills brought to bear on moral issues. To say that it has no philosophical relevance, however, is to fail to recognise the inherent relationships among psychology, epistomology, and philosophy. Thus, until such general reasoning skills are acquired, advances to the highest moral reasoning stages is not possible. Indeed, a theory which failed to acknowledge such individual differences would be inferior. Elitism becomes an issue only if one were to equate human worth with reasoning ability, a posture adamantly opposed by cognitivedevelopmental theorists, and one which we assume Gillon would oppose, as well.
Regarding of the sample Gillon's empirical concerns include the sample size, and the possible atypicality of medical students and the attendant non-generalisability of research in this area to medical school settings. Most moral education projects usually do not employ large samples, both because they are not satistically necessary (as in the case of survey research) and because the research is extremely demanding of the time and energies of both researchers and participants. Moreover, the individual moral education project should not be viewed as an isolated experience. Rather, it is part of a larger set of such projects, all employing similar techniques, conducted with a variety of subject populations, and providing mutually supportive outcomes. Were the data obtained in any one project found to be divergent from previously conducted research, both would bcsubject to close scrutiny in terms of methodology and theoretical adequacy. As it was, our techniques and data were highly typical of the extant literature; in fact, our results were more impressive than most. The point of divergence of our study was not in technique or outcome, but rather in the focus on medical-ethical dilemmas. The purpose of the study, furthermore, was not to test the theory, but rather to demonstrate the applicability of the approach to medical ethics education.
Second, it may or may not be the case that medical school students are more disposed than other students to finding 'practical or clinical' solutions to dilemmas, as Gillon claims, or that they may be more emotional and intuitive and less rational in their judgments. These statements appear to be internally inconsistent, the comparison groups are not specified, and no supportive evidence is cited. It seems unlikely that medical students are indeed more 'practical' in problem solving situations than are students of business, engineering, clinical psychology, criminal justice, or, for that matter, sculpture. In addition, whether or not they are is really quite irrelevant to the task of ethical education in the cognitive-developmental view. The goals of such education are to enhance reasoning skills, to promote logical sophistication, and to enable more abstract, comprehensive, and integrated resolutions of ethical dilemmas. As such, the starting point of reasoning skills is a factor to be taken into account in the design of a program, but it requires ino Debate 29 alteration of either the theory or technique of moral education, and no limitation of results to specific occupational or other non-cognitive characteristics of participants. The cognitive-developmental approach is suitable for anyone who is functioning at a stage below that maximally attainable given the individual's more general cognitive (Piagetian) and social perspective taking stage. Further, one might argue that MDs would do well to suspend their emotions and 'intuition' in dealing with medical ethical problems, given the arbitrary, inconsistent, and non-rational bases of these perspectives. In this light, training in the use of comprehensive logic, an encompassing social perspective, and a profound respect for the rights and dignity of the individual would seem to be highly desirable for medical students.
Conclusion
Gillon's final comment, that in medical ethical training we should concentrate on impartial analysis of a broad range of practical alternatives and encourage the student to 'develop his own informed but autonomous decisions', is not greatly disparate from our own position. Indeed, a major component of the Blatt and Kohlberg technique of moral education is to promote critical analysis of alternate solutions, leading to autonomous moral decisions. The cognitive-developmental approach assiduously avoids preaching specific solutions (the content of moral reasoning), focusing on the structure of reasoning employed in arriving at solutions. What this approach does that many others do not is to enhance the student's ability to deal with the moral principles involved in a medicalethical dilemma as opposed to inculcating merely expedient, utilitarian, or conventionally popular solutions.
I read very carefully Robert Sells' reply to my paper on the supply of kidneys for transplantation. I readily concede that the attitude of the medical profession towards kidney transplantation is a factor in inhibiting the supply of kidneys, indeed I gave considerable weight to the point myself. I persist in the view, however, that there are other factors principle among which are the framework, wording and policy of the Human Tissue Act. Sells makes four points. The first is that the present supply of kidneys for transplantation is approximately one third of those required each year. This appears almost as an afterthought in the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph. I made it my starting point. It is, after all, the crucial issue. The second point Sells makes is that the Human Tissue Act is unimportant or 'non-problematical' in inhibiting the supply of organs. Third, Sells identifies as 'the single most important impediment' the reluctance of the medical profession to refer dead patients with functioning kidneys as donors. Finally, Sells states categorically at the outset that the supply of organs would not be significantly increased by changing the law to an opting out principle. The posture adopted by Sells is, in other words, that which I discussed under the heading of, retain the existing law with increased publicity and education, and dismissed as unlikely to produce significant improvement in the foreseeable future.
The lack of kidneys May I comment briefly upon these points made by Sells? As regards the first, the lack of kidneys, I took and take the view that we ought to be giving prominence to this fact and asking why it comes to pass. This is particularly so in light of the fact that it is now nineteen years since Parliament passed the law, the express purpose of which was to facilitate transplantation surgery and that kidney transplants have been an available form of therapy for some thirteen or so years. By relegating this
